Week in Review for Violent Extremism and Terrorism Analysis: 2023-04-10
Happy Tuesday everyone, here is a recap from the field of violent extremism and terrorism analysis.
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Financing Violent Extremism: An Examination of Maligned Creativity in the Use of Financial Technologies
In my latest publication with Jessica Davis (from Insight Threat Intelligence) and Tore Hamming, we examined how different sorts of terrorist and violent extremist actors utilise financial technologies and cryptocurrencies to finance their operations. The process of terrorist adoption of financial technologies is spelled out for various organisations and can assist analysts to estimate whether and when a group or terrorist actor would embrace a financial technology or cryptocurrency. The workbook also includes terms that may be used to search information holdings for terrorist adoption of cryptocurrencies or financial technologies, offering early warning of terrorist adoption.
- Most terrorist organisations, cells and individuals gradually embrace new technology, tactics, strategies and processes. Finance is more confined by external constraints than other areas of potential innovation and adaptation, hence few organisations or entities actually innovate in finance.
- Most terrorist actors are bound by financial and economic institutions, making terrorist financing difficult to innovate. Structures control them. Thus, terrorist finance patterns and approaches are better regarded as adaptation and learning rather than innovation.
- When economic and financial systems evolve, most terrorists adapt to new financing methods. Terrorists employ financial technologies and cryptocurrencies when they are convenient and widely used. Until then, motivated individuals or cells can innovate, but groups or more established cells or organisations seldom adopt new financing methods early.
Buildings Networks and Addressing Harm” A Community Guide to Online Youth Radicalization
It isn’t enough to widely distribute resources like the Parents & Caregivers Guide and the Building Networks Guide. They must also be shown to work, to improve the ability of parents and caregivers; coaches and mentors; school counselors and mental health practitioners to spot and intervene in cases of potential radicalization. PERIL and SPLC are committed to evidence-based, iterative work that measurably reduces the risks associated with radicalization to violent extremism. At every stage of intervention, it is crucial that both positive outcomes and potential “backfire” effects be assessed.
These two impact studies present the results of assessment and feedback conducted on both the Parents & Caregivers Guide and the Building Networks Guide. The impact study of the Parents & Caregivers Guide quantitatively measures its effect on parents and caregivers, their knowledge of extremism and radicalization and their self-reported willingness to intervene on behalf of a young person at risk for radicalization. Similarly, the impact study of the Building Networks Guide assesses the awareness, knowledge and understanding of extremism gained by readers, as well as their capacity, capability, willingness and confidence to intervene in radicalization. The focus group report qualitatively assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the Parents & Caregivers Guide based on the expertise of educators, mental health professionals, coaches, and other youth group leaders.
All three assessments point to the same conclusion. The Parents & Caregivers Guide and the Building Networks Guide are highly effective tools for raising awareness, building confidence and offering strategies for intervention against extremism and radicalization. However, there is much work left to be done. While these guides offer a foundation on which this work can commence, more targeted and specific techniques for intervening are badly needed. PERIL and SPLC’s ongoing work is directed toward that end.
Right-wing Extremist Targeting Youths Through Gaming
Right-wing extremists try to radicalize children and young people on online gaming platforms. Right-wing extremist actors are networking online to recruit new members. They also took advantage of popular gaming platforms to network and build communities. One of these gaming platforms is Roblox. According to the company, almost 60 million players from all over the world meet there every day, more than 16 million of them from Europe. The game platform is particularly popular with children and teenagers. On Roblox, users can not only play the games of others, but also design their own game worlds, some of which are used for re-enactments of terrorist attacks.
Involving victims/survivors in P/CVE
Involving victims/survivors of terrorism in prevention/countering violent extremism (P/CVE) work can be extremely valuable. They have a unique perspective as they have directly experienced the consequences of a terror attack. Practitioners who wish to include victims/survivors in their P/CVE approaches might be hesitant to do so out of concern for potentially re-traumatising the victim/survivor or otherwise harming their wellbeing.
On 29 and 30 September victims/survivors of terrorism, representatives of victim organisations, and other P/CVE practitioners who are already working with victims/survivors or wishing to do so, gathered in Nice (France) to discuss how to respectfully and safely include victims/survivors of terrorism in P/CVE. Four core topics were discussed in relation to involving victims/survivors of terrorism in P/CVE efforts.
Firstly, the value of their testimonials in P/CVE approaches were explored. Secondly, the role of victims/survivors of terrorism in restorative justice efforts and in building social cohesion was discussed. Thirdly, the importance of cooperation with media (with a P/CVE aim) was explored. Finally, empowering young victims/survivors was highlighted.
TCAP Insights: Understanding Patterns of Terrorist Exploitation Online by Tech Platform Size
Key insights:
- Small and medium-sized tech platforms, when measured by user base, were the most highly exploited tech platform sizes based on volume of content identified on their platforms. Smaller platforms also averaged a lower remove rate of alerted terrorist content, than large and medium-sized platforms.
- Earlier stage tech platforms, those with between 0-50 employees, averaged a higher volume of terrorist content on their platforms than companies with more than 50 employees (Mid and Enterprise). These earlier stage platforms also averaged a lower removal rate of alerted terrorist content.
- Given smaller platforms, when considering both user base and resources, average lower removal rates of terrorist content, further engagement and support should be targeted towards smaller platforms.
Investigating Digital Threats: Digital Infrastructure
Just as with a legitimate online site, any disinformation campaign or spyware attack relies upon digital infrastructure that includes one or more domains, servers, and applications. Anything running on the internet leaves behind some traces that can be used to track its activity and in some cases link together different infrastructure. This chapter gives an introduction to online tools you can use to investigate digital infrastructure.
Dangerous Organizations and Bad Actors: Atomwaffen Division
Atomwaffen Division (AWD)一German for Nuclear Weapons Division一was a neofascist accelerationist organization and movement working towards societal collapse through a violent revolution. The group gained notoriety and became known as one of the most violent neo-Nazi movements in the 21st century due to its links to numerous acts of extreme violence in the United States, including terrorist plots, murders, and arrests. AWD largely based its ideology and objectives on James Mason’s Siege doctrine and is credited for popularizing “Siegism” among modern accelerationist movements. The group also promoted Charles Manson’s teachings and aimed to instigate a race war to bring about the destruction of modern society and make way for a new white ethnostate based on principles of national socialism.
Founded online by then-teenager Brandon Clint Russell (a.k.a. Odin) in 2015, AWD encouraged white supremacist, antisemitic, anti-establishment, and anti-LGBTQ+ beliefs. AWD was based in the United States and active in at least 23 states at one point. The group was organized into a series of decentralized terror cells united by the common vision of apocalyptic civilizational destruction. Members followed the “leaderless resistance” model, a popular protective tactic among accelerationist groups intended to make them harder to track and enforce against.
AWD’s high-profile past and trailblazing activity on Iron March has led it to evolve into a brand beyond the control of AWD leadership. The Siegist, hyper-violent accelerationist movement that AWD spearheaded continues to live on through AWD-branded splinter groups and the remaining loyal members of AWD, who resurfaced in February 2020 to launch an AWD successor group named the National Socialist Order (NSO). The NSO aims to emphasize the Siegist ideology that the original group was founded on while distancing itself from links to Tempel ov Blood. As of 2022, the NSO operates mostly as a propaganda outlet and is focused on recruitment rather than on in-person activities.
How Waco Became a Right-Wing Rallying Cry (podcast)
Rachel Monroe discusses the 1993 siege of Waco and why Donald Trump recently held a rally there.
Are we looking at crises through polarized lenses? Predicting public assessments of the official early responses to the COVID-19 pandemic in eight countries
Understanding public appraisal of the governments’ responses to the COVID-19 pandemic has extensive implications for the political management of crises that require a substantial amount of civil collaboration. Using open data from a comparative online survey in eight countries (Australia, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States), we have run mixed multilevel fixed-effects models for the pooled data and linear regression models for each country to investigate which factors are associated with respondents’ evaluations (i.e. assessments of the effectiveness) of their governments’ responses to the pandemic. Results show that political orientations, including left-right ideology and interventionist values, are strongly associated with evaluations. Their associations with government evaluations are remarkably similar in all eight countries, indicating that the pattern of influence persists across different contexts. In some countries, personal experiences with the crisis and socio-demographic characteristics also condition the evaluation of governments’ responses. Our results show that political ideology serves as a shortcut for the assessment of urgent and controversial measures by governments. This has implications for the ability of governments to elicit citizens’ cooperation with the policies confronting the crisis and can impact the effectiveness of government responses to protect people from harm.
The Information War: Online Disinformation Around the Conflict in Ukraine (Podcast)
This week, we’re exploring the spread of online disinformation in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. We unpack the shifting online ecosystem around the conflict, and track pro-Kremlin narratives and disinformation campaigns both domestically and abroad. We also ask who’s behind these narratives and on which platforms they are being spread.
Join Anne Craanen as she speaks to Jordan Wildon, a Digital Investigator, Telegram expert and Founder & CEO of Prose Intelligence. And Charlie Winter, Co-Founder and Director of Research at ExTrac.
Splinter groups less violent than parent organizations
In a new article, published in the Journal of Conflict Resolution, researchers Kaitlyn Robinson and Iris Malone find that militant splinter factions tend to be less violent than their parent organizations. The findings are the result of an NCITE-funded research project spearheaded by Martha Crenshaw, NCITE principal investigator and senior fellow emerita at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation. Robinson and Crenshaw summarize the key points of the article below.